Arab National Bank (ANB)

| Recommendation | ACCUMULATE | Risk Rating | R-3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Share Price | SAR19.65 | Target Price | SAR23.00 |
| Implied Upside | $\mathbf{+ 1 7 . 0 \%}$ |  |  |

## Trading at a Discount to Book; Initiating w/ Accumulate

Arab National Bank (ANB) has a 8\% market share in loans ( $7^{\text {th }}$ largest among domestic banks) and $8 \%$ market share in deposits ( $7^{\text {th }}$ largest among domestic banks). Moreover, ANB commands the $4^{\text {th }}$ largest market share in retail lending (6\%). The stock trades at a steep $43 \%$ discount to its 5-year median P/B multiple. Also, ANB is trading at a $32 \%$ discount to its median P/E. Moreover, ANB's peers (excluding Islamic Banks \& NCB) are currently trading at an average P/B of 1.0x, while ANB is trading at $0.8 x$, implying a decent discount of $16.4 \%$.

## Highlights

- ANB is a mid-sized bank with a $\mathbf{8 \%}$ market share in total loans, $9 \%$ in corporate loans and $6 \%$ in retail loans ( $4^{\text {th }}$ largest); we estimate an overall loan book CAGR of $\mathbf{6 . 6 \%}$ during 2015-20e. ANB's loan book is split between the corporate (77\%) and retail (23\%) segments over the past four years (2012-2015).The bank has been reducing its exposure to the retail segment from $35 \%$ in 2006 to $23 \%$ as of 2015 . Moreover, the retail segment of the loan book grew by a CAGR (2010-15) of $8.2 \%$ vs. a CAGR of $12.6 \%$ for the corporates. Moreover, in 3Q2016 ANB's retail loan receded by 3.2\% YTD (Total retail loans on a system wide level increased by $5.3 \%$ YTD) vs. an increase of $1.1 \%$ at the corporates' segment (Total corporate loans on a system wide level increased by $4.9 \%$ ). This leads us to believe that the bank is scaling back on retail lending due to a weak macroeconomic environment, especially with retail becoming problematic due to public sector employees' salary cuts. We are of the view that the bank will take conservative approach and keep its loan book flat in 2017. While a~8\% exposure to contractors is not a cause for alarm, potential write-offs due to stress seen in that sector cannot be ruled out. We pencil in marginal declines of $0.4 \%$ and $0.2 \%$ in 2016 and 2017, respectively. We are expecting low single-digit growth in 2016 and 2017 as ANB's LDR reached SAMA's $90 \%$ limit/ceiling. Management would most likely bring this ratio down by a combination of lower loan growth and higher fund raising.
- We expect weak performance in 2016 and 2017, followed by a strong 2018; we pencil in a bottom-line CAGR of $\mathbf{7 . 5 \%}$ in 2015-2020e. We estimate a $6.3 \%$ drop in net income to SAR2.8bn in 2016 mainly due to a $34.2 \%$ jump in net provisions \& impairments. We expect provisions to increase based on possible asset quality concerns as a result of the weak macro-economic environment. Hence, we pencil in a cost of risk (CoR) of 74bps (59bps in 2015) which leads provisions to increase to SAR869.8mn. On the other hand, we expect NIMs to increase by 11 bps to $2.78 \%$ given the FED's rate hike earlier. Having said that, the bank faces funding pressure as the bank's LDR is currently at $89 \%$ (close to SAMA's $90 \%$ ceiling);. We expect cost of funding to increase by 120 bps vs. 75 bps for asset yields $(51 \%$ and $54 \%$ of ANB's loan book and investment portfolio were repriced at the end of 1Q2016). As such, We forecast net interest income at SAR4.13bn in 2016, implying growth of $7.4 \%$. As far as 2017 is concerned, we expect net income to dip by $2.6 \%$ to SAR2.7bn led by weak non-interest income and higher provisions. We estimate net interest income to increase by only $5.4 \%$ to SAR 4.35 bn as the bank raises further interest bearing deposits. In 2018 we estimate net income to increase by $28.3 \%$ to SAR3.5bn, led by positive performance across the board coupled with a sharp drop in provisions.
Catalysts
- Beyond a stabilization/recovery in oil prices, the following developments could be perceived positively by the market: 1) further announcements by the govt. of payments to contractors 2) further clarity on long-term development initiatives in KSA; 3) increasing market share and 3) further improvement in NIMs \& spreads.


## Recommendation, Valuation and Risks

- Recommendation and valuation: We assign a Price Target of SAR23.00 and an Accumulate rating. ANB is trading at a $2017 \mathrm{e} \mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B}$ and $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ of 0.8 x and 7.3 x , respectively. The stock offers an attractive yield of $5.1 \%$.
- Risks: 1) Depressed oil prices remains the biggest risk for ANB and the Saudi banking sector and 2) Greater-than-expected asset quality deterioration, especially given the stress seen in the contracting segment.

Key Financial Data and Estimates

|  | FY2015 | FY2016e | FY2017e | FY2018e |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| EPS (SAR) | 2.96 | 2.78 | 2.70 | 3.47 |
| EPS Growth (\%) | 3.1 | -6.3 | -2.6 | 28.3 |
| P/E (x) | 6.6 | 7.1 | 7.3 | 5.7 |
| BVPS (SAR) | 21.9 | 23.2 | 24.4 | 26.1 |
| P/B (x) | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| DPS (SAR) | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.25 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates; Note: All data |  |  |  |  |

Key Data

| Current Market Price (SAR) | 19.65 |
| :--- | ---: |
| Dividend Yield (\%) | 5.1 |
| Bloomberg Ticker | ARNB AB |
| ADR/GDR Ticker | N/A |
| Reuters Ticker | 1080. SE |
| ISIN | SA0007879105 |
| Sector* | Banks \& Financial |
| Svcs. |  |
| 52wk High/52wk Low (SAR) | $26.30 / 14.25$ |
| 3-m Average Volume (‘000) | 502.0 |
| Mkt. Cap. (\$ bn/SAR bn) | $5.2 / 19.7$ |
| Shares Outstanding (mn) | $1,000.0$ |
| FOL Limit* (\%) | 49.0 |
| Current FOL (\%) | 40.7 |
| 1-Year Total Return (\%) | $(18.6)$ |
| Fiscal Year End | December 31 |

Fiscal Year End December 31
Source: Bloomberg (as of November 14, 2016), *Tadawul (as of November 14, 2016);

## Valuation

We value ANB using 4 variations of the Residual Income Model (RI); 1) Warranted Equity Valuation, 2) RI based on a fundamental P/B, 3) RI based on a persistence factor and 4) RI based on RoE converging to cost of equity:
a) We utilize a WEV technique derived from the Gordon Growth Model: $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B}=(\mathrm{RoAE}-\mathrm{g}) /(\mathrm{Ke}-\mathrm{g})$. This model uses sustainable return on average equity (RoAE) based on the mean forecast over the next seven years, cost of equity (Ke), expected long-term growth in earnings (g) and present value of interim dividends to arrive at a fair value for this stock. We consider this method best suited to arriving at an intrinsic valuation through the economic cycle.
b) We derive ANB's fair value by employing the RI valuation technique (based on a fundamental $P / B$ ), which is calculated based on the sum of its beginning book value, present value of interim residuals (net income minus equity charge) and the present value of the terminal value (we apply a fundamental $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B}$ multiple based on the Gordon Growth Model to the ending book value at the end of our forecast horizon). We derive the $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B}$ from the Gordon Growth Model: $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B}=(\mathrm{RoAE}-\mathrm{g}) /(\mathrm{Ke}-\mathrm{g})$. This model uses sustainable return on average equity (RoAE) based on the mean over our forecast period, cost of equity ( Ke ) and expected long-term growth in earnings (g) to arrive at fundamental/justified P/B. Based on this method we arrive at a fundamental P/B of 1.0x.
c) The second variation of the RI that we use is based on a persistence factor. The persistence factor is applied on the terminal value. The maximum persistence factor is 1.0 , which means that residual income does not decline and will continue indefinitely. The minimum persistence factor is 0 , which means that residual income stops after the initial stage. Companies with stronger or stable market share will have higher persistence factors. High persistence factor is applicable when the firm has a low dividend payout and when the industry has been able to maintain RoEs above the cost of equity historically. Low persistence factor is applicable when RoE is extremely high and likely to decline and high levels of accruals \& special items, such as nonrecurring items that will weigh down future RoE. In ANB's case we use an persistence factor of 1.0 as it fits the above stated criteria.
d) The third variation of the RI that we utilize is based on RI converging to cost of equity where the terminal value equated to zero. This method assumes that over time the industry becomes highly competitive and firms will not be able to generate economic profits. As such profits are not reinvested in the company, instead are paid out in the form of dividends to shareholders.
The RI model is suitable for the following reasons: 1) when the company does not pay dividends or the pattern of dividend payments is unpredictable; 2) the company is expected to generate negative free cash flows for the foreseeable future and 3 ) as the traditional free cash flow to equity (FCFE) formula does not apply to banks. A major advantage of RI in equity valuation is that a greater portion of the company's intrinsic value is recognized from the beginning BVPS as opposed to the terminal value (common in traditional FCFE methodology).
We use KSA's 5 year swaps rate of $4.2 \%$ as the risk free rate and factor in an adjusted beta of 1.0 vs. 0.85 (actual from Bloomberg) as we believe banks are a direct proxy for the economy. Finally, we add a local equity risk premium of $7.5 \%$ to arrive at a Ke of $11.70 \%$.

Valuation Methodologies

| Fundamental P/B (WEV) |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Sustainable RoAE (\%) | $12.0 \%$ |
| Estimated Cost of Equity (\%) | $11.7 \%$ |
| Terminal Growth Rate (\%) | $5.0 \%$ |
| Fundamental P/B | 1.0 x |
| Intrinsic Value (SAR) | 25.00 |
| Current Market Price (SAR) | 19.65 |
| Upside/(Downside) Potential (\%) | $27.2 \%$ |
| Equity Value (SAR mn) | 25,000 |


| RI Based on Fundamental P/B |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Beginning BVPS (2017e) (SAR) | 23.2 |
| Present Value of Interim Residuals (SAR) | $(0.31)$ |
| Present Value of Terminal Value (SAR) | 0.78 |
| Fundamental P/B | 1.0 x |
| Intrinsic Value (SAR) | 23.00 |
| Current Market Price (SAR) | 19.65 |
| Upside/(Downside) Potential (\%) | $17.0 \%$ |
| Equity Value (SAR mn) | 23,000 |
|  |  |

Source: Bloomberg, QNBFS estimates

| RI Based on Persistence Factor |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Beginning BVPS (2017e) (SAR) | 23.2 |
| Present Value of Interim Residuals (SAR) | $(0.31)$ |
| Present Value of Terminal Value (SAR) | $(0.42)$ |
| Less: Minority Interest | 0.73 |
| Persistence Factor | 1.0 x |
| Intrinsic Value (SAR) | 22.00 |
| Current Market Price (SAR) | 19.65 |
| Upside/(Downside) Potential (\%) | $12.0 \%$ |
| Equity Value (SAR mn) | 22,000 |
|  |  |


| RI Based on RoE Converging to Ke |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Beginning BVPS (2017e) (SAR) | 23.2 |
| Present Value of Interim Residuals (SAR) | $(0.67)$ |
| Present Value of Terminal Value (SAR) | 0.0 |
| Less: Minority Interest | 0.73 |
|  | 22.00 |
| Intrinsic Value (SAR) | 19.65 |
| Current Market Price (SAR) | $12.0 \%$ |
| Upside/(Downside) Potential (\%) | 22,000 |
| Equity Value (SAR mn) |  |

[^0]
## Trading at a 43\% discount to its Historical P/B...



Source: Bloomberg

ANB is trading below book value on the account of concerns on asset quality; The stock never traded below book value during the global financial crisis. The stock trades at a steep discount to its 5 -year average $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{B}$ and $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{E}$ ratios. Moreover, if we exclude the bull years and the global financial crisis years the stock is still trading at a $43 \%$ and $32 \%$ discount to its median $P / B$ and $P / E$, respectively. Moreover, ANB's peers (excluding Islamic Banks \& NCB) is currently trading at an average P/B of 1.0x, while ANB is trading at $0.8 x$, implying a decent discount of $16.4 \%$.


[^1]

Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

## Key Forecasts

## Loan Portfolio

ANB is a mid-sized bank with a $8 \%$ market share in total loans, $9 \%$ in corporate loans and $\mathbf{6 \%}$ in retail loans ( $4^{\text {th }}$ largest); we estimate an overall loan book CAGR of $\mathbf{6 . 6 \%}$ during 2015-20e. ANB's loan book is split between the corporate ( $77 \%$ ) and retail ( $23 \%$ ) segments over the past four years (2012-2015).The bank has been reducing its exposure to the retail segment from $35 \%$ in 2006 to $23 \%$ as of 2015 . Moreover, The retail segment of the loan book grew by a CAGR (2010-15) of $8.2 \%$ vs. a CAGR of $12.6 \%$ for the corporates. Moreover, in 3Q2016 ANB's retail loan receded by $3.2 \%$ YTD (Total retail loans on a system wide level increased by $5.3 \%$ YTD) vs. an increase of $1.1 \%$ at the corporates' segment (Total corporate loans on a system wide level increased by $4.9 \%$ ). This leads us to believe that the bank is scaling back on retail lending due to a weak macroeconomic environment, especially with retail becoming problematic due to public sector employees' salary cuts. We are of the view that the bank will take conservative approach and keep its loan book flat in 2017. We pencil in marginal declines of $0.4 \%$ and $0.2 \%$ in 2016 and 2017 , respectively. On the other hand, we grow the loan book by $7.7 \%, 11.9 \%$ and $15.0 \%$ in 2018,2019 and 2020, respectively. We are expecting low single digit growth in 2016 and 2017 as ANB's LDR is very close to SAMA's $90 \%$ limit/ceiling. Management would most likely bring this ratio down by a combination of lower loan growth and higher fund raising.


[^2]Shari'ah compliant financing to drive loan growth, as expected. Given KSA's corporate and retail sectors' preference for Shari'ah compliant loans, the former has grown by a CAGR of $14.6 \%$ (2007-2015) vs. $1.7 \%$ that of conventional loans. Given this trend, we are of the view that conventional loans will continue on shrinking.

Currently Shari'ah Compliant Loans Dominate ANB's Loan Book


Source: Company data

## Deposit Book

ANB has a $8.0 \%$ market share in deposits, $7^{\text {th }}$ among domestic banks; we estimate deposits to grow by a CAGR of 5.5\% during 2015-20e. The bank's share of interest-bearing deposits vs. its peers' deposit base has always been greater. In 2015 non-interest bearing deposits peaked (inline with 2012) at $49 \%$ of total deposits. Given the previous Fed rate hike and the anticipation of further hikes in December 2016 and 2017 coupled with an LDR of $89 \%$, we believe ANB will continue to raise interest-bearing deposits. The bank's non-interest bearing deposits grew at a CAGR of $9.4 \%$ (2010-2015) vs. interest bearing deposits which grew by $10.7 \%$. Moreover, we do not expect this trend to reverse; we forecast a interest bearing deposits growing by a CAGR (2015-20e) of $9.9 \%$. Further, we expect deposits to drop by $6.0 \%$ in 2016 and tick up only by $1.0 \%$ in 2017 as the economic outlook still remains bleak. However, we expect deposits to expand by $9.0 \%$ in 2018 as the economy revives. On a side note, SAMA has enforced a deposit insurance scheme in which banks would have to apply a charge of 5bps on non-sovereign deposits. Consequently, this would increase interest expense going forward.

Share of Interest-Bearing Deposits on the High-Side vs. Peers; Further Increase Anticipated to Bring LDR Below SAMA's Limit


[^3]LDR (Loans to stable sources of funds) near SAMA's $\mathbf{9 0 \%}$ limit. ANB's LDR reached 89\% in 3Q2016, which poses an obstacle for growth in the short to medium term.


Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

## Operating Performance

We expect weak performance in 2016 and 2017 followed by a strong 2018; we pencil in a bottom-line CAGR of $\mathbf{7 . 5 \%}$ in 2015-2020e vs. $\mathbf{9 . 2 \%}$ (2010-2015). We estimate a $6.3 \%$ drop in net income to SAR2.8bn in 2016 mainly due to a $34.2 \%$ jump in net provisions \& impairments. We expect provisions to increase based on possible asset quality concerns as a result of the weak macro-economic environment. Hence, we pencil in a cost of risk (CoR) of 74 bps ( 59 bps in 2015) which leads provisions to increase to SAR869.8mn. Moreover, in-line with the same reasoning, we estimate fees and commissions to decline by $18.0 \%$ to SAR1.05bn. Furthermore, we expect NIMs to increase by 11bps to $2.78 \%$ given the FED's rate hike earlier. Having said that, the bank faces funding pressure as the bank's LDR is currently at $89 \%$ (close to SAMA's $90 \%$ ceiling);. We expect cost of funding to increase by 120bps vs. 75bps for asset yields ( $51 \%$ and $54 \%$ of ANB's loan book and investment portfolio were repriced at the end of 1Q2016). As such, We forecast net interest income at SAR4.13bn in 2016, implying growth of $7.4 \%$. As far as 2017 is concerned, we expect net income to dip by $2.6 \%$ to SAR2.7bn led by weak non-interest income and higher provisions. We estimate net interest income to increase by only $5.4 \%$ to SAR4.35bn as the bank raises further interest bearing deposits. Moreover, we pencil in a $8.0 \%$ drop in fees and commissions to SAR970.10mn. Furthermore, We remain conservative; we estimate provisions to gain by $20.6 \%$ to SAR1.05bn (CoR 89 bps ). In 2018 we estimate net income to increase by $28.3 \%$ to SAR3.5bn, led by positive performance across the board coupled with a sharp drop in provisions. We caution that our estimates could be revised downward if oil prices remain depressed longer than expected and if asset quality deteriorates more than expected.


[^4]
## Net Interest Income (SAR mn)



Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

Profitability Dominated by Corporate Banking Followed by Treasury; Retail Banking has Steadily Weakened


[^5]NIMs To Progressively Improve


Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

RoAE to Remain Under Pressure On the Back of Excessive Provisioning But to Gradually Improve


[^6]
## Efficiency

ANB's cost-to-income generally on the high-side, but has improved. ANB's efficiency ratio has always been elevated. This is primarily due to its retail banking operation where the bank has an extensive network of 151 branches. Thus, ANB's retail banking cost-to-income ratio has sat around the $62 \%$ vs. $\sim 24 \%$ and $12.8 \%$ for corporate banking and treasury, respectively. Moreover, the bank's opex grew by a CAGR (2010-2015) of $6.4 \%$ vs. $5.5 \%$ in revenue. This growth in cost is likely due to the bank's retail banking division which is more cost intensive vs. corporate banking and treasury. Going forward, we estimate the bank's cost-to-income ratio to steadily improve as the bank contains costs during economic hardships. We expect opex to be flattish in 2016 and 2017. On the other hand we pencil in a growth of $7.1 \%$ in 2018 assuming the economy improves and the bank starts operating more aggressively.
Operating Efficiency Requires Improvement


Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

## Asset Quality

ANB's asset quality has marginally worsened (not in a significant manner) but it could get worse by the end 2016 and 2017 . So far in 3Q2016, ANB has not experienced any significant stress in its asset quality; NPLs dropped by $16.2 \%$ YTD. However, the NPL ratio slightly moved up to $0.87 \%$ vs. $0.75 \%$ in 2Q2016 but lower than 1Q2016's $1.03 \%$ ( $1.04 \%$ in 2015). The drop in NPLs appears to be driven by a $\sim$ SAR200mn write-off. We forecast some deterioration in asset quality towards the end of 2016 and 2017 as is likely during periods of economic distress. Moreover, the construction industry especially contracting could negatively impact banks including ANB ( $8 \%$ of ANB's loan book is exposed to the building \& construction segment). Thus, we estimate an increase in the NPL ratio to $0.95 \%$ and $1.10 \%$ in 2016 and 2017, respectively. It should be noted that there is an upside risk to our NPLs forecast, should major contractors default. I is worth mentioning that although we expect the NPL ratio to increase, the increase in the ratio still implies NPLs to remain lower than the medium-term historical levels. Prior to 2009 and 2010 , the NPL ratio was on average $1.3 \%$ (2004-2008). However, during the global financial crisis, this ratio jumped to $3.0 \%$. As a result, management has been reducing this ratio through write-offs, with the largest one occurring in 2013.


Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates


Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

## Capitalization

Strong capitalization levels. ANB has always maintained healthy capitalization levels and we do not expect this trend to reverse.


[^7]
## Company Description

As of 3Q2016, Arab National Bank had a 8\% market share in loans ( $7^{\text {th }}$ largest among domestic banks) and $\mathbf{8 \%}$ market share in deposits ( $7^{\text {th }}$ largest among domestic banks). Moreover, ANB commands the $4^{\text {th }}$ largest market share in retail lending ( $6 \%$ ) and $4^{\text {th }}$ largest branch network. Established in 1980 as a JV with prominent Jordan based Arab Bank, ANB is a universal bank offering conventional and Shari'ah compliant services to corporates and retail customers, investment banking, brokerage and asset management. The bank has a network of 151 branches and over 1,000 ATMs.

Solid shareholder base. ANB enjoys a strong and stable shareholding structure.
Major Shareholders

| Shareholders | Investor Type | Country | Share (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Arab Bank PLC | Institutional | Jordan | 40.00 |
| General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI) | Government | KSA | 11.28 |
| Rashed Abdulrahman Al Rashed \& Sons Co. | Institutional | KSA | 9.96 |
| Al Jaber Trading Co. | Institutional | KSA | 5.65 |
| Total |  |  | 66.89 |

Source: Tadawul

Subsidiaries/Associates

| Company | Country | Share (\%) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Arab National Investment Co. (ANB Invest) | KSA | 100 |
| Arabian Heavy Equipment Leasing Co. (AHEL) | KSA | 87.5 |
| Arab Insurance Agency | KSA | 100 |
| Al Manzil Al Mubarak Real Estate Financing Ltd. | KSA | 100 |
| ANBI Business Gate Fund | KSA | 25.47 |
| Metlife-AIG-ANB Cooperative Insurance Co. | KSA | 30 |
| Saudi Home Loans Company | KSA | 40 |
|  |  | 4 |

[^8]Detailed Financial Statements

| Ratios | FY2015 | FY2016e | FY2017e | FY2018e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Profitability (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| RoAE | 14.0 | 12.3 | 11.4 | 13.7 |
| RoAA | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 2.0 |
| RoRWA | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.1 |
| NIM (\% of IEAs) | 2.67 | 2.78 | 2.96 | 3.01 |
| NIM (\% of RWAs) | 2.58 | 2.60 | 2.70 | 2.79 |
| NIM (\% of AAs) | 2.29 | 2.44 | 2.57 | 2.66 |
| Spread | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| Efficiency (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Cost-to-Income (Headline) | 38.0 | 37.6 | 37.3 | 36.1 |
| Cost-to-Income (Core) | 38.7 | 38.5 | 37.7 | 36.7 |
| Liquidity (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| LDR | 85.2 | 90.3 | 89.2 | 88.2 |
| Loans/Assets | 67.9 | 68.8 | 67.4 | 67.6 |
| Cash \& Interbank Loans-to-Total Assets | 9.4 | 12.3 | 12.3 | 10.3 |
| Deposits to Assets | 79.7 | 76.2 | 75.5 | 76.7 |
| Wholesale Funding to Loans | 6.6 | 10.6 | 10.9 | 9.5 |
| IEAs to IBLs | 204.2 | 191.9 | 178.7 | 170.3 |
| Asset Quality (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| NPL Ratio | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| NPLs to Shareholder's Equity | 5.6 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 5.9 |
| NPLs to Tier 1 Capital | 5.8 | 5.0 | 5.5 | 6.1 |
| Coverage Ratio | 224.6 | 269.9 | 293.1 | 288.3 |
| ALL/Average Loans | 2.5 | 2.6 | 3.2 | 3.6 |
| Cost of Risk | 59 | 74 | 89 | 65 |
| Capitalization (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Tier 1 Ratio | 13.6 | 14.1 | 14.7 | 14.5 |
| CAR | 15.5 | 15.9 | 16.5 | 16.3 |
| Tier 1 Capital to Assets | 12.5 | 13.5 | 14.0 | 13.9 |
| Tier 1 Capital to Loans | 18.5 | 19.6 | 20.7 | 20.5 |
| Tier 1 Capital to Deposits | 15.7 | 17.7 | 18.5 | 18.1 |
| Leverage (x) | 7.8 | 7.2 | 7.0 | 7.0 |
| Growth (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Net Interest Income | 6.1 | 7.4 | 5.4 | 8.1 |
| Non-Interest income | 7.5 | -10.3 | -6.8 | 16.4 |
| Total Revenue | 6.6 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 10.5 |
| Opex | 6.5 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 7.1 |
| Net Provisions \& Impairments | 27.0 | 34.2 | 17.0 | -26.4 |
| Net Income | 3.3 | -6.3 | -2.6 | 28.3 |
| Loans | 11.5 | -0.4 | -0.2 | 7.7 |
| Deposits | 4.7 | -6.0 | 1.0 | 9.0 |
| Assets | 3.5 | -1.7 | 1.9 | 7.4 |
| RWAs | 10.3 | 2.6 | 1.0 | 8.0 |

[^9]| Income Statement (In SAR mn) | FY2015 | FY2016e | FY2017e | FY2018e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Net Interest Income | 3,845 | 4,128 | 4,349 | 4,703 |
| Fees \& Commissions | 1,286 | 1,054 | 970 | 1,116 |
| FX Income | 513 | 477 | 520 | 614 |
| Investment Income | 62 | 107 | 46 | 69 |
| Other Income | 194 | 206 | 181 | 200 |
| Non-Interest Income | 2,055 | 1,844 | 1,718 | 1,999 |
| Total Revenue | 5,900 | 5,972 | 6,067 | 6,702 |
| Operating Expenses | $(2,243)$ | $(2,243)$ | $(2,261)$ | $(2,421)$ |
| Net Operating Income | 3,657 | 3,729 | 3,805 | 4,281 |
| Net Provisions \& Investment Impairments | (700) | (940) | $(1,099)$ | (809) |
| Minority Interest | 8 | (12) | (3) | (3) |
| Net Profit | 2,964 | 2,777 | 2,704 | 3,469 |

Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

| Balance Sheet (In SAR mn) | FY2015 | FY2016e | FY2017e | FY2018e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Assets |  |  |  |  |
| Cash \& Balances with Central Bank | 10,428 | 12,762 | 12,889 | 12,644 |
| Interbank Loans | 5,575 | 7,834 | 8,050 | 6,195 |
| Net Investments | 33,294 | 26,167 | 29,202 | 34,988 |
| Net Loans | 115,656 | 115,208 | 115,000 | 123,898 |
| Other Assets | 3,522 | 3,632 | 3,774 | 3,667 |
| Net PP\&E | 1,945 | 1,971 | 1,770 | 1,859 |
| Total Assets | 170,421 | 167,574 | 170,686 | 183,251 |
| Liabilities |  |  |  |  |
| Interbank Deposits | 5,673 | 10,225 | 10,558 | 9,713 |
| Customer Deposits | 135,761 | 127,616 | 128,892 | 140,492 |
| Term Loans | 2,011 | 2,016 | 2,016 | 2,016 |
| Other Liabilities | 4,344 | 3,828 | 4,125 | 4,215 |
| Total Liabilities | 147,789 | 143,685 | 145,590 | 156,435 |
| Shareholders' Equity | 21,894 | 23,163 | 24,373 | 26,095 |
| Total Liabilities \& Shareholders' Equity | 170,421 | 167,574 | 170,686 | 183,251 |

[^10]
## KSA Banking Landscape

## Loans/GDP: KSA Underbanked



Source: Respective Central Banks, IMF, UN

Young Population: Favorable for Retail Banking


ANB Claims 4th Largest Branch Network



[^11]

Source: Company financials

2015 Corporate Loans Share: NCB Followed by BSFR Largest)


3Q2016: ANB Maintained its Market Share


2015 Retail Loans: ANB Commands 6\% Market Share (4th


Source: Company financials


Source: Company financials

Corporate Loans Dominate as is the Case in the GCC Saudis


Source: Company financials



2015 Deposits: NCB \& RJHI Dominate ANB Lost


3Q2016 Deposits: RJHI Gained Market Share While NCB \&


Source: Company financials

ANB's LDR (headline/simple LDR) On The Upper End


Source: Company financials

## Recommendations

Based on the range for the upside / downside offered by the 12 month target price of a stock versus the current market price

## OUTPERFORM Greater than $+20 \%$

| ACCUMULATE | Between $+10 \%$ to $+20 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| MARKET PERFORM | Between $-10 \%$ to $+10 \%$ |
| REDUCE | Between $-10 \%$ to $-20 \%$ |
| UNDERPERFORM | Lower than $-20 \%$ |


| R-2 | Lower than average |
| :--- | :--- |
| R-3 | Medium / In-line with the average |
| R-4 | Above average |
| R-5 | Significantly above average |

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[^0]:    Source: Bloomberg, QNBFS estimates

[^1]:    Source: Bloomberg

[^2]:    Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

[^3]:    Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

[^4]:    Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

[^5]:    Source: Company Data

[^6]:    Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

[^7]:    Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

[^8]:    Source: Company data

[^9]:    Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

[^10]:    Source: Company data, QNBFS estimates

[^11]:    Source: SAMA, Bloomberg

